will only sketch a strategy for defending an enlightened contextualism: a full-dress defense would require far more. Be forewarned, as well, that I don't endorse all the ways these terms are in fact deployed: some uses strike me as downright misleading. But my task here is to highlight senses/uses, not to criticism them. Speaking of 'senses' and 'uses', I don't think much hangs on whether the terms in question really have multiple senses, or whether theorists just use them differently, hence I will slide between 'senses' and 'uses' in what follows.
II. The Terminological Reflections
Start with 'context sensitive'. One thing a philosopher can mean by so labeling a word is that it is a speaker-context magnet. That is, it's the kind of word which (except in direct discourse) inevitably finds its in-context referent in the speaker-context, regardless of how deeply embedded it is. 'I', 'now', and 'here' are familiar examples. No matter what complex story is told, no matter how deeply the word 'now' is embedded syntactically, if it isn't directly quoted, its referent will be, well, now. Consider Patty, who says: 'John was very drunk last night, and terrifically confused about the time. He said he wouldn't be here now'. Spell it out as you wish, it still seems like 'now' is the time at which Patty spoke, not the time John did, nor the time he confusedly intended. (Similarly for 'here'.)
Another sense of 'context sensitive' is that the expression's in-context reference is somehow relative to a feature of the utterance context: its extension changes in some fashion even while holding "the evaluation world" constant. (Compare C&L's definition on p. 89 and 99.) Obvious cases include 'left' and 'right': if I say, 'I hereby give Herman the car on the left', which car I gave him depends on how I am oriented towards the automobiles in question, and not because 'left' is ambiguous. Somewhat less obvious examples include 'second' (as in, 'Turn at the second set of lights') and 'peso' (which can be used to refer to various currencies, with the referent depending on speaker context -though, I insist, 'peso' is not ambiguous). The least obvious relative terms are the ones scientists find out about: e.g., 'weighs precisely six pounds' is satisfied by different classes of things depending upon the gravitational force at work in the situation that the speaker is talking about. (Note: the word 'situation' is important here. The possible world must remain constant, otherwise the evaluation world has been changed. What alters must only be which part of the evaluation world is being discussed.) A third, and weaker, usage of 'context sensitive' has to do with pragmatic determinants of what is asserted, stated, or claimed. In this sense, to call a word context sensitive is just to say that, even after disambiguation, it can be used to assert, state or claim that various properties are instantiated. Take 'weapon'. In an utterance context where a law has been passed banning all weapons in public buildings, Andreas could say of his archive: 'There are no weapons in this building', and speak truly --even though a rock which was once used in a murder is stored there. In contrast, if the police are drawing up a comprehensive record of which murder weapons are stored where, Andreas' utterance about his archive would be false.
Not because the rock or anything else had been moved, or otherwise changed its properties, but because the property literally asserted/claimed to hold, using 'weapon', is different… because of the utterance context. (Or so says the believer in this kind of context sensitivity.) For those who accept that pragmatics frequently affects speech act content, this third sense is quite weak: pretty much any word can be so used, so virtually any word is "context sensitive" in this sense. Yet the final way of understanding 'context sensitive' that I want to highlight is weaker still. To call a word context sensitive in this sense is to say that various things count as falling in its extension. That means something like: given the utterance context, we would reasonably treat them as such (even if they aren't strictly instances). For instance, in a legal context we might reasonably count shrimp, squid and lobster as fish, even though they are not strictly speaking fish at all. In sum, we have: The most complex of the distinctions is next: having truth conditions. On the first sense, a disambiguated expression has truth conditions just in case it is true or false tout 2 To further bring out the differences here, note two things. First, it's doubtful that expressions which are "context sensitive" in the last three senses pass C&L's tests, in Chapter 7. Second, whereas the senses (a) and (b) are specific to particular lexical items, (c) and (d) are not. (By the way, this is one place where I do not endorse a usage that I describe: I myself would not call words to which (c) and (d) alone apply 'context sensitive items '.) court. That is, the expression type partitions the set of worlds into two classes: every world satisfies either the sentence or its negation, and no world satisfies both. I hope this is a sense of 'truth condition' that no one endorses for natural language expressions. Even many declaratives don't have truth conditions in this sense, not least because they contain speaker-context magnets. But introducing this sense is useful because it highlights that everyone weakens their notion of truth condition somewhat -compared, say, with what might be found in a classical logic. The second sense is this: a disambiguated expression type has truth conditions only if it is true or false -it partitions the worlds --relative to a set of previously established parameters. Example parameters include speaker and addressee (for 'I' and 'you'), objects, times and places demonstrated (for 'this', 'that', 'then' and 'there'), utterance time (for 'now', 'today', 'yesterday', and tense), place of utterance (for 'here'), and world of utterance (for 'actual'). This is not merely the idea that a sentence has truth conditions if it is true or false "relative to the context of utterance": what a context is must be highly restricted for this sense of 'having a truth condition' to apply. The third notion, in contrast, precisely is that a sentence, to have a truth condition, must be true or false relative to "Big Context": the whole panoply of intentions, facts, etc., at the moment of utterance. To see the contrast, take 'Ernie Lepore arrived late'. Even relativized to the above list of parameters, it does not seem to partition the set of worlds. (Assigning July 15, 2005 at 3:45 p.m. EST as the referent for tense, thereby fixing all relevant parameters, is the result satisfied by worlds such that Ernie arrived late for a meeting with his Dean, but was on time for his classes?) In contrast, together with "Big Context" this sentence might well partition the worlds. The fourth notion is hard to spell out. There is a felt difference between sentences in which a metaphysically required element is not specified, and sentences in which a linguistically inherent element is omitted. (Compare p. 66 of Insensitive Semantics.) For instance, the action of following must happen somewhere, at some pace, for some reason. These are metaphysically required elements of any act of following. In contrast, who or what was followed, the object of 'follow', seems in some sense to be (not just metaphysically but) linguistically required -this despite the fact that 'Robyn followed' is syntactically well- Before moving on, a word is in order about the attractiveness of this last notion. One can't help but grant to C&L that there's something fishy about the "felt difference" (pp.
43ff, 61, 65 and 67). We cannot rely on such a maleable intuition, one might reasonably insist, to provide a contrast being "genuine" propositions and sub-propositional schemas.
As for "Big Context", inquiring whether something has truth conditions and if so what they might be, while applying this sense of 'truth condition', becomes utterly intractable.
It also seems that partitioning the worlds in two, even relative to certain parameters, is too much to demand for being a genuine proposition: the kinds of cases that Charles
Travis has made us all aware of suggest that no pre-established set of parameters will do that. The great virtue of sense (2e), then, is that it affords a clear diagnostic for being genuinely propositional, and one which is not subject to Travis' slippery slope. (My one worry about it is that it seems to make having truth conditions too cheap: for instance, 'Uruguay did' and 'Herman will' seemingly both come out as having truth conditions. But let's set that aside.)
Now for 'assertion'. Two relevant uses of it come immediately to mind. But, since space is running short, I will flag only two. One is the idea that a piece of information is psychologically relevant just in case it is at the agent's cognitive disposal:
it can be accessed; it can be made consciously available; it could be used in processing.
is psychologically relevant in interpretive situation S only if the agent occurrently makes use of I in S. Call this (4b). 
III. Towards Enlightened

CC5:
The so-called "minimal proposition" is not psychologically relevant.
The strategy for holding onto these in the face of Insensitive Semantics, not surprisingly, is to maintain that each T-series thesis is true on one sense of its bold-faced term, but to insist that so read the thesis is not inconsistent with the CC-series theses.
In particular, T1 is true on sense (1a) of 'context sensitive', the speaker-context magnet sense; T2 is true on sense (2e) of 'truth condition', the Tarskiian sense; T3 and T4 are both true on sense (3b) of 'assertion', the report-oriented sense; and T5 is true on sense (4a) of 'psychologically relevant', the "it's accessible" sense. The idea, however, is that CC1 is nevertheless true on sense (1c), for, so read, CC1 merely acknowledges If the strategy succeeded, would the result be that everyone ultimately agreesthe enlightened contextualist with C&L, and they with everyone else? By no means.
There are disagreements about details even between C&L and the enlightened contextualist: some appeared immediately above, e.g., whether T1 is true on sense (1b) of 'context sensitive', and whether T2 is correct on sense (2d) of 'having truth conditions'. Two asides about the "minimal proposition". First, I think one should read contextualist claims about such propositions "not existing" as loose talk, amounting to: "such things don't partition the set of worlds, and they don't play a role in processing". Second, C&L contend that communication is impossible without a minimal proposition, since only it provides something to (dis)agree about. This seems wrong on several fronts: (i) communication succeeds when sub-sentential assertions take place, but there is no minimal proposition in that case; (ii) conversational participants don't merely (dis)agree about the minimal proposition, they also frequently (dis)agree about what is asserted, stated, etc.; (iii) communication often enough succeeds in particularized conversational implicature, and the minimal proposition can't be the key to that.
conditions, and what they are, but rather that it's unhelpful qua contribution to cognitive science. (At any rate, that is a worry of the present enlightened contextualist.) More specifically, if our main business is describing the linguistic system, a truth theoretic statement of truth conditions may be fine. If we are trying to understand processing, however, T-sentences seem otiose at best: surely I do not process an utterance of 'Jason is deeply mistaken' by deploying the T-sentence "'Jason is deeply mistaken' is true iff Jason is deeply mistaken". ( 
